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Introduction
During the Cold War period, the Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR) was not an area of major geopolitical importance due to specific conditions. But, geopolitical changes, particularly the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, and WBSR has now become a meeting point of interests not only from countries bordering the Black Sea but also from many global players.
Today, WBSR is the primary geographic area where the interests of the Western democracies and Russia collide, and where disagreement between them is most pronounced. Although the Cold War struggle has long passed, distrust and confrontation at a smaller scale continues to persist. Apparently, the two parties are unable to understand each other fully despite the fact they have many more common interests on the political agenda than disputes. Accordingly, the way they manage these disputes along the new NATO and EU borders will very much depend on their future relationship as well as the global political and security order. To gain a better understanding of the regional challenges, opportunities, and viable solutions, this study examines the common issues associated with the wider Black Sea region, the Russian 2 perspective, the value of Russia as a Reliable Partner, and the need for a new approach in developing cooperation with Russia. None of the problems are intractable, but they do require understanding, patience, and a commitment to the rule of law.
Wider Black Sea Region Common Issues
There is not a strict geographical delineation of WBSR on which scholars can agree. However, for many scholars the expression WBSR refers mainly to a politicaleconomical entity rather than a geographical one. 2 Consequently, no comprehensive analysis on the subject can ignore the diplomatic, economic, military, and social interconnections existing among states bordering the Black Sea and between these states and the states near the Black Sea. 3 Therefore, while recognizing a degree of geographic separation, the WBSR as an entity is flexible, meaning it could include not only the states bordering the Black Sea, but also states from the Balkans, Aegean Sea, and even Eastern Mediterranean, in the West, as well as states from the Caucasus and Central Asia, to the East. 4 As it is the bridge between Europe and East Asia (a region of increasing global interest), WBSR serves as the transit corridor for the crucial Caspian and Central Asian hydrocarbon trade to Europe. Accordingly, the European Union considers the Black Sea region an area of strategic importance for its energy supply security. 5 Naturally, greater trade and interaction with the EU raises the need to deal with organized trans-border crime, such as trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs, illegal migration, illicit waste disposal, and industrial pollution. 6 As a consequence of the 9/11 terror attacks and subsequent Global War on
Terror, WBSR has become "an irreplaceable access corridor for American-led and NATO forces to bases and operation theatres in Central Asia and the Greater Middle 3
East." 7 But WBSR is not simply a corridor. It is also a borderland, a seam between Christianity and Islam, making WBSR the first line of European defense against radical Islamic extremism and Iranian nuclear threat, and in this context against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In view of the plethora of regional and international issues, the geopolitical importance of WBSR becomes obscured. Crucially important issues shaping the relationships between West and Russia, such as the conflict in Afghanistan, the competition for energy resources, and the defense against ballistic missiles appear to have overriding importance. Yet, the most important and foremost feature of the WBSR and the key to unlocking all the gates to a fruitful relationship is its "frozen conflicts."
WBSR's frozen conflicts are a legacy of "the end of the history" era, unleashed at the end of Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union thrust this part of the world into an identity crisis, as Samuel Huntington put it. 8 From Kosovo to Transdniestria, and continuing with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, the demons of instability threaten Europe's dream of peace and cooperation. Today, these chronic conflicts, especially those of the Caucasus, "provide the most likely flashpoints in the Eurasia region." 9 "Frozen conflicts" refers to enduring antagonisms which have become latent or manifest into sporadic armed confrontations, mainly because the parties involved are exhausted from previous conflicts or because of external pressure from regional or global powers. 10 "Frozen conflicts" within the WBSR share some common features:
 Their roots can be traced to the communist era. The communist regimes, in the case of the Stalin government in a dramatic manner, redrew borders 4 without taking in consideration the ethnic and historical realities, and changed ethnic demographics by using deportation and colonization, among other means.
 They are based on ethnic rivalries.
 "Victim states" were forced into conflict because no alternative options were available. Separatists intentionally escalated the armed conflict in order to draw in the regular forces of affected states. 11 "Victim states"
refers to United Nations member states which are unable to control a portion of their sovereign territory as a result of a war of secession.
 These newly created separatist "states" cannot function or survive without substantial support from outside benefactor states.
 Control over the territory of separatist states is maintained by force with the overwhelming help coming from outside benefactors.
 In this play benefactors participate "in the dual role of party to and arbiter of the conflicts."
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Above all, the tragedy is, these breakaway entities could easily become safe havens for illicit activities in addition to the fact that they drain economic resources and political energies from their weak "victim states" and their impoverished societies.
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Despite the rhetoric of human rights and conflict prevention, neither the United
States nor the EU has ever put the issue of solving the "frozen conflicts" on top of its bilateral agendas with Russia. 14 Curiously for the Western democracies, striving to maintain a post-communism status-quo only serves to perpetuate and legitimize the communist era abuses. Thus, the tensions from these "frozen conflicts" continue to build 5 and will have dire consequences. If the external pressure, which keeps the internal tensions contained, is ever released, the resulting explosion will engulf neighboring states and beyond, threatening to destabilize the entire region.
While it is in the best interests of the West to resolve these "frozen conflicts," they must contend with Russia, which bitterly opposes any interference in its affairs. In order to proceed with solving these challenging issues the West and especially the United Relationships between Russia and the West were at an impasse because the West, in particular Washington, had made a "crucial error . . . to treat post-Soviet Russia as a defeated enemy" which Russians never consider themselves to be. 35 Russian mistrust of the West seems to be supported not only by the facts but also the words that are behind these deeds. Russian leaders have the right to be circumspect since former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski defended NATO's expansion as "necessary to assist the United States in controlling the Eurasian continent because it has most of the world's energy resources and because all the historical pretenders to global power originated in Eurasia." 36 Western attitudes have also had a negative impact on Russian public opinion. In turn, Russian leaders bluntly reflect this public disquietude towards the West. 37 For example, in concert with Russian attitudes regarding Georgia "many Russian commentators with government ties express the conviction that Washington's single objective in the Caucasus is to push Russia out of the region, and that the Kremlin must act alone by confronting US policies." 38 It has become apparent in Russian politics that "embracing closer relations with the West is no way to boost your popularity in Russia," 39 which is illustrative of the Russian presidential elections in 2012. Medvedev's apparent friendly attitude towards the Obama Administration opened the way for Putin to win the presidency again.
Why it is Worthwhile to Make Russia a Reliable Partner
In an increasingly challenging international environment, it is more prudent to minimize uncertainty. Russia is undoubtedly one actor which demands as much certainty as possible. With its vast territories and enormous natural resources, in many 9 aspects, Russia is simply too big to be challenged, "and that limits Western ability to influence its developments." 40 Factoring in its enormous nuclear arsenal, it becomes very clear why Russia will continue to have considerable maneuver room in the foreign policy realm. 41 Consequently, it behooves the West to partner with Russia in at least three geographic areas: the Black Sea and the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East.
Regarding the Black Sea and the Caucasus, with the exception of the 2008 summer military clash in Georgia, Russia's policy in the region does not have a military dimension, but rather is energy related. 42 By employing diplomatic means, leveraging economic issues, and exploiting ethnical and religious disputes, Russia has created an area of "controlled instability," aiming to deter NATO and EU from securing strategic partnerships with its targeted "victim states," viz. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova. 43 Marginalizing the role of regional states and global actors in the Black Sea area, Russia seeks to compel the "victim states" to abandon the quest for NATO collective defense and rely instead on individual security, of course subject to the Kremlin's interests. 44 The Russian intervention in Georgia demonstrated that Russia wields sufficient leverage over the major European states to make them react cautiously. And the instrument of power is energy resources. A number of EU member countries are already heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, and that dependence is deepening.
As a recent study noted: "The WBSR plays a crucial role in this context, because it is the only area in Europe's vicinity that has the potential to serve as a key producer and transit area for new sources of European gas supplies." 45 
10
In this respect Russia deftly exploited the European Union's incoherent energy policy in regards to hydrocarbon supplies for the domestic market. Because the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project was postponed sine die, and the Europeans were Furthermore, this kind of bilateral arrangement has stymied real economic benefits for the other member states and has made it ineffective as a mechanism for regional crisis management. 55 So, for the United States, the Black Sea area will remain restricted unless it engages directly with every country in the region, especially with Russia which remains the central actor.
However, the resolution of the "frozen conflicts" will bring huge energy benefits to China's nuclear capabilities remain a major point of concern for strategic analysts, an issue which the Obama administration seems oblivious of. They argue that by reducing American nuclear capabilities based solely on negotiations with Russia, "the administration is damaging America's deterrent capabilities, which have historically been the keystone of the Asian balance of power and regional stability." 61 But strategic discussions with China, not only on nuclear capabilities, but also on space capabilities and cyber security will be less conclusive without Russia's involvement. 62 Aside from tightening the reins on China, this approach will push toward "transparency for nuclear arsenals and their associated activities, which formed the bulk of strategic discussions between Washington and Moscow." Moscow has been employing its instruments of power to gain control over the "sphere of privileged interests," and the war with Georgia was an important step toward the realization of this goal. 64 Even while struggling with domestic economic problems and shifting its attention to the Asia-Pacific region, the United States should not forget its obligations as a global leader to address latent issues in the WBSR where "the demons of the past-like ethnic tensions, nationalism, racism, and extremism-are not dead," but just waiting a favorable moment to set the region in turmoil. 65 Failure to initiate conflict prevention in the WBSR would reflect badly on U.S. leadership. U.S. interests will not be served by perpetual instability, tensions, and conflict in the WBSR. In this regard, cooperation with Russia is an imperative U.S. interest.
The Georgia war severely strained the Russian-American relationship, but much common ground exists so hope still exists.
Having a better understanding of the situation, the Obama administration pushed the "reset" button regarding its relations with Russia. Even though the Obama administration's engagement initiatives with Russia seem modest, they have achieved 15 dramatic results. 66 The most immediate changes in U.S. diplomacy include "altering the tone that surrounds the handling of dispute; treating Russia as a potential partner in addressing shared challenges, instead of approaching Moscow with demands; and emphasizing transparency when it comes to US goals and plans." 67 As a result of this cordial relationship, Russia supported the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1929, which set the toughest-ever sanction regime on the Iranian nuclear program.
Russia expanded the development of new transit corridors to support U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and agreed to the New START treaty, which called for reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. 68 The prospects for further cooperation are promising. To be certain, there are issues on which the West and Russia still differ, but it is very clear for to both sides that "NATO is not a threat to Russia, nor Russia to NATO." 69 As a result of the total reset in the Russia-U.S. relationship, a window of opportunity exists for a resolution of the issues plaguing the WBSR.
Today, the competition between Russia and the Western democracies is no longer "determined by any overarching global competition, structurally determined by a global balance of power, or by the ideological competition." 70 As President Obama noted, Russia is not the Soviet Union. That means Russia is no longer an enemy.
Russia recognizes U.S. superiority and does not want to challenge this globally. The
Kremlin's intentions are clear and openly declared and this is in stark contrast to the inscrutability of Beijing. Despite alarmist fears of a resurgent Russia, the reality is "Russia's strength is fragile, resting as it does on unfavorable demographic trends, a single-commodity economy based on hydrocarbon extraction, and a lack of serious investment in repairing its crumbling infrastructure." 71 Obviously because given the values it chooses to promote and its role as the leading nation of the international community, all the other actors will expect it to take the initiative and confront all the challenges.
First of all, U.S. foreign diplomacy must acknowledge that it should give priority to this region for reasons previously mentioned. Of course, there will always be some common ground with Russia but it will not take the place of a true partnership. To solve the problem the United States must find ways to address and not ignore it in the hope that it will resolve itself.
Second, work on each case separately by engaging Russia directly, one subject Russia is blessed with vast reserves in oil and natural gas but lacks the capacity to exploit them, especially in the Far East and in the Arctic. In search of revenues, which have been affected by the recent economic crisis, the Kremlin is ready to open this economic sector to foreign partners. This is a great opportunity for American entrepreneurs to develop cooperation on a huge scale with Russian counterparts, and the first step has already been made.
In the first part of 2012 a major deal with immense potential for revenues was signed between ExxonMobil and Rosneft. The deal concerns joint participation in projects in the Arctic, Black Sea, United States, and Canada. 82 It is a big step forward but relatively small compared to the real potential for economic cooperation. More steps should follow in the direction of bilateral trade. But an increase in bilateral economic ties, which for the United States currently comprises less than one percent of its international trade, will only be made if Cold-War era stereotypes are overcome. To date Congress hasn't moved to grant Russia Permanent Normal Trading Relations and the United States remains the only WTO member to act like this with Russia. 83 A direct diplomatic engagement supported by strong economic ties and major direct capital investments is more likely to persuade Moscow to settle the issues in the WBSR rather than pursuing a specific anachronistic Cold War era policy.
Third, do not use different scales for the same type of problem.
The strongest criticism of Russia regarding the complex situation in WBSR is its disregard for the rule of law.
This disregard for the rule of law underscores the biggest issue in the WBSRthe "frozen conflicts." But these conflicts cannot be solved in a classic framework because of those who remain committed in their "support of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty" of countries like Georgia based upon "the principles and the norms of international law, the United Nation Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act" while for others, like Serbia, these principles are denied. 87 To gain Russia as a reliable partner these practices should cease.
Tsygankov concludes that in order to change Russian attitudes, a strategy towards Russia should rely on long term objectives which "are important to society as a whole, rather than the ruling elite only." 88 Still, Dimitri Tretin is optimistic about the democratic trends even if "Russia is unlikely to experience another revolution." 89 The majority of Russians are not eager to make radical changes. But as the latest research reveals, Russian society is changing 24 from the periphery. The change in the top will eventually come but it will be a long process as a succession of small social transformations all over the country. A new approach for WBSR and Russia coming from the United States, as the single entity capable of dealing with the Kremlin, "will be especially effective when conducted on a reciprocal or mutually acceptable basis." 91 This new approach should be based on the following principles:
 WBSR: a priority of American diplomacy.
 Treat each case separately: even though all regional "frozen conflicts"
share common characteristics the interests around each one are different.
 Avoid using regional organizations: some parties in these organizations, not only Russia, have used the forum only to block the process.  Have patience: after a long period of distrust, positive changes won't come over night.
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As the United States is shifting its strategic weight to Asia-Pacific, not having a full partnership with Russia regarding WBSR issues is like turning the back on a wounded bear while facing a young and growing confident tiger. The situation is dangerous enough, so the United States should think twice about its options before it is too late. Moreover, the United States should take into account the implications of its policy over the nations living in the proximity of Russia's frontiers.
Russia might be a wounded bear today, but history never stands still. No matter the type of government or society, Russia is resilient and has the capacity to recover.
Many times during the centuries Russia was brought to its knees, as many consider it to be today. But the lesson is, Russia came back stronger every time, and the last time, it was barely stopped west of Berlin. Furthermore, without exception, the ones who truly suffer are the nations living in its proximity because it happens that Russia never forgets an affront. But now the time is right, and the United States is strong enough to change the trend of history for good.
Only the United States can grant the spread of democracy, security, prosperity and the rule of law in the WBSR. All nations in the region, good or bad, big or small,, depending on one's perspective, are hoping that America will take a pragmatic approach to pacify the region. America owes this to them and for itself, and should not waste time and have the region settled once and for all, before is not too late.
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